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Tuskegee Modern, Or Group Rights
under the Constitution
BY RicHARD A. EPSTEiN*
I. How QUIcKIy WE FORGET
The subject of this brief Article is captured only inadequately
by its title: Tuskegee Modem. For those of us who still remember
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,' this title should evoke a certain sense of
d6jh vu. Gomillion was hailed as an obvious advance for its time,
for it accomplished what was thought to be morally necessary, by
decisively moving the law forward into uncharted waters. Tuskegee
had been laid out as a perfect square before the Alabama legislature
converted the city into a "strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided
figure." ' 2 The purpose and effect of the legislation was to eliminate
from the city's rolls all but four or five of the 400 black citizens
eligible to vote in local elections. The shift in boundaries did not
remove any white persons from the list of eligible voters. In the
Supreme Court, the case was thought to be practically easy because
it was evident to all that the sole reason for the tortured redefinition
of the city's boundaries was the exclusion of black voters from the
district. No other explanation was, or could have been, offered for
this "essay in geometry and geography." ' 3 Writing for a unanimous
court,4 Justice Frankfurter struck down the redrawing of the
boundaries under the Fifteenth Amendment.5
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. A.B. 1964, Columbia University; B.A. 1966, Oxford University; LL.B. 1968, Yale
University. This Article is a somewhat expanded version of remarks that I made at the 1992
meeting of the Constitutional Law Section of the American Association of Law Schools
held in San Antonio on January 5, 1992. The topic for the session was group rights under
the Constitution. I should like to thank Annalisa Pizzarello for her valuable assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
1 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
2 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
3 Id. at 347.
4 With due allowance for the concurrence of Justice Whittaker, see id. at 349.
1 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. Co~sr. amend. XV, § 1.
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Yet by the same token, the case was difficult as a legal matter
because the Court was required to overcome the well-established
proposition that, given the allocation of power under the Consti-
tution, the drawing of local lines within a state is the business of
the state and no one else. Even though the Fifteenth Amendment
clearly imposes some limits on the states' power to deny or abridge
the right to vote, it was far from clear before Gomillion how far
those prohibitions went. To be sure, the core of the Fifteenth
Amendment reached cases where black citizens were refused the
right to vote while the city boundaries remained unchanged. It was
not possible on anyone's reading for Tuskegee to have its cake and
eat it too: to impose taxes and other obligations on black citizens
to whom it overtly denied the right to vote. Indeed, if that course
had been open to Tuskegee, doubtless, it would have been adopted.
Gomillion was different because Alabama and the city were
prepared to pay a stiff price to keep Tuskegee securely in white
hands. They were prepared to exile from the city those that might
vote against the dominant powers, thus removing all threats from
the local tax rolls, and from the control of the city's ordinances
and administration. Indeed, one unanswered question is why the
black voters exiled from the city protested if they were able to
obtain a greater measure of self-determination and control by the
reconfiguration of the boundaries.
The place of motive in constitutional adjudication is hardly
secure. It is easy enough to hold that when the motive is corrupt,
it is powerful evidence that certain acts were or were not done.
That is the root of the "sham transaction" doctrine that plays so
large a role in taxation. 6 But no one doubts that the reorganization
of the city boundaries went through in fact as well as on paper. It
is no small step to argue that a bad motive alone is sufficient to
allow a court to undo a local act that on its face meets all the
prerequisites of a valid law. It requires that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment no longer deal exclusively with matters intrinsic to the voting
relationship itself, such as registration requirements, literacy tests,
and grandfather clauses. Now its scope must be expanded to cover
activities that are themselves not voting or incident thereto solely
because of the impact they have on voting behavior and partici-
pation.
One sense of the magnitude of the shift can be captured by the
line of argumentation adopted by Frankfurter in order to under-
6 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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mine the traditional view. In the first place, he noted that Tuskegee
was correct in its general claim that a state could order its internal
governance as it saw fit. Cities could be created and destroyed
even when the effect was to create an implicit transfer of wealth
through the vagaries of the tax system.7 Frankfurter then relied on
a line of cases' that established the proposition that states could
not liquidate (and then reincorporate) municipal governments in
order to allow them to escape their obligations under preexisting
bond contracts. 9 These were in essence sham transaction cases and
were in their own time understood as such. Frankfurter then in-
voked the unconstitutional conditions doctrine of Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission,10 and its familiar assertion
that '[i]t is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Con-
stitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence.""' But he never explained why that doctrine was appli-
cable given its explicit rejection in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh12
and similar cases.
" See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 342. In Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161
(1907), the allegation was that the absorption of the town of Allegheny into the city of
Pittsburgh would increase the Allegheny citizens' tax burdens by forcing them to pay for
Pittsburgh improvements when they had already funded their local improvements before
incorporation. Hunter was treated as both a Contracts Clause and a due process decision.
The Court first rejected the "novel proposition" that there was any contract between the
municipal government and its own citizens. See id. at 177. It found the due process claim
"not so devoid of merit" as to dismiss it out of hand but nonetheless dispatched it with
great alacrity, noting that so far as public property is concerned, state governments have
"absolute power" over municipal property held for governmental purposes. See id. at 177,
179.
, Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344.
9 See, e.g., Shapleigh v. City of San Angelo, 167 U.S. 646 (1897); Port of Mobile
v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886). Frankfurter did not even mention the actual ground on
which Mobile and Shapleigh were decided. Both cases involved a public variation of a
liquidation/reincorporation transaction in that the new government took over the same
territory as the old one, after making the effort to shed its liabilities. The cases were treated
therefore as instances of "successor liability," for which there are many private law
analogies. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) (acquiring company that
continued manufacturing business subject to strict liability for product defects). The exis-
tence of third party creditors distinguished these cases from Hunter.
10 271 U.S. 583 (1926). I discuss this case at length in Richard A. Epstein, The
Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. Rav. 4, 47-54 (1988).
" Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345 (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926)). Such guaranties were manipulated out of existence in
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932). Frankfurter later returned to the doctrine in
equally cursory fashion. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347.
12 207 U.S. 161 (1907). For a discussion of Hunter, see supra note 7.
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The need for explanation arises on any disinterested reading of
the cases on which Frankfurter relies for they are manifestly unable
to carry the burden that he attaches to them. Gomilion, if any-
thing, looks more like Hunter-the case that announces the general
rule-than it does like the Contract Clause cases because the per-
sons whose rights are deprived are local citizens and not external
creditors. If the Due Process Clause does not reach the reconfi-
guration of local governments (when it surely reached inconsistent
modes of levying assessments within a single jurisdiction), then
why should the Fifteenth Amendment kick in when the state was
prepared to pay the price of excluding black citizens from local
affairs? Frost does not carry the day for in that case only desig-
nation was at stake: the Court held that the California Railroad
Commission could not regulate a private carrier by calling it a
public carrier. But once the local government was prepared to pay
the price and create a separate scheme of regulation for private
carriers, even one identical in form and function to that applied
to public carriers, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was
at its end.
Indeed, the objections to the use of the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine strike even deeper. The doctrine at its root is
concerned with bargains that go astray between the state and
individual citizens. Whatever the rationalization for the doctrine-
I think that it is the control of monopoly power by the sovereign 3-
everyone agrees that there must be some bargain between citizen
and state in order for the doctrine to apply at all. In Frost, the
question was whether the state could use its control over public
highways to require Frost to waive its rights against regulation,
which it enjoyed as a private carrier. But Tuskegee used pure force
without negotiation.
Frankfurter, then, appealed to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine because it offered an apparent way to distinguish Hunter,
which had held that the state had absolute discretion to determine
the boundaries of its various municipalities. All that commends his
flabby analysis is the enormity of the injustice that he tried to
combat. The question is-how does one rethink the issue in order
to salvage the result? Here I think that the key to the problem is
that Hunter itself is wrong. In that case, the Court brushed off
the due process argument and assumed that any redistribution
" See Epstein, supra note 10, at 47.
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through the system of public funding was a political and not a
constitutional matter. But if the takings argument were allowed to
take hold, then the implicit shift of Pittsburgh tax burdens to
Allegheny citizens would mark a taking that could be condemned
under the standard disproportionate impact tests developed else-
where in the law.1 4
The parallel question, then, is whether this reconfiguration of
Tuskegee works a similar detriment to black citizens. It would be
useful to take evidence on the point, but even in the abstract, a
credible case can be made that it does; the white interests that
controlled the process could not be expected to incorporate black
interests in their political utility function. While members of the
city, these persons enjoyed a bundle of goods and services for
which they paid taxes. If the net level of benefits after the forced
dissociation was negative, then there is a similar imbalance of
benefits and burdens as in Hunter itself. But the Court decided
not to treat this imbalance as a matter of economic deprivation
but as a sheer matter of racial hostility. It thus displaced any
concern with the incidence of taxation by looking at the case solely
through the lens of race and animus. It would have had an easier
time if there had been a strong prohibition in place against system-
atic redistribution of burdens through government action.
Whatever one may think of Gomillion, the case did usher in a
new era whose importance has only increased in the intervening
thirty plus years. Because the economic and property arguments
carried no weight, the case was argued and interpreted as a race
case involving bad motives, and most relevant to the issues here,
as a case involving group rights: if all persons shut out of the city
had been white, then no one would have thought any constitutional
claim was presented, no matter what the increase or decrease of
the relative fortunes of the two groups. The key element in the
case was that of racial animus-a special class of takings. It was
not merely people hurting people. It was whites hurting blacks,
hurting them because of the differences in color, and the separation
of people with two different colors.
4 The standard citation is Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Although located in the same volume as Gomillion, the connection between the two cases
is never mentioned, let alone stressed. The familiar judicial gap between race and property
exerts its influence here.
1991-92]
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II. A COLOR-BLIND INTERLUDE
In the years after Gomillion, the constitutional dimension in
this area of litigation has retreated because of the strong and
powerful intervention of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,15 which
reduced the pressure on the Court to decide matters under the
Fifteenth Amendment alone. The original version of Section 2 of
the Act read as follows:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color.16
On its face, the statute is as color-blind as the Fifteenth Amend-
ment on which it rests, for both extend their protection to "any
citizen." In addition, the Supreme Court in its initial construction
of this provision treated the Voting Rights Act as an "intent"
statute and held that any disproportionate impact of a voting
practice was not actionable unless and until it was shown that it
was adopted with some form of discriminatory intent.17 There is
little need to belabor the obvious connection between the intent
requirement under the Voting Rights Act and the parallel debate
about disparate impact under Title VII, 18 which came out quite the
opposite way in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 19 The number of cases
in which the effect in some sense is disproportionate, but for which
some neutral justification might be proffered, is very large. The
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act saw the crafting of a
political compromise whereby a "results" test was introduced to
expand the scope of liability,20 limited only by a caveat that an-
"5 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973
to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
11 79 Stat. 437. For a detailed history of the Act, with obvious hostility to the 1982
Amendments, see ABIGAIL M. THmERSTROM, WHoSE Votes CouNT? AFFnruAvE ACTION
AND MioRr VoTNG RIGHTs (1987).
17 See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1980).
11 Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)).
19 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
20 As amended, the Act provides:
Sec. 2. (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote On account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) as provided in
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nounced, "nothing in this section establishes a right to have mem-
bers of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population. '21
The parallels between the Voting Rights Act and Title VII are
quite extraordinary. The basic provision of the Voting Rights Act,
Section 2(a), even after 1982, contains only a color-blind injunc-
tion, which appears to grant protection of equal status to all
persons. Such is the obvious import of the words "of the right of
any citizen of the United States." But Section 2(b) makes it clear
that its commitment to universality is, so to speak, only skin deep
because it refers to a "protected class" of persons whose interests
are entitled to special protection under the Act, just as the color-
blind language of Title VII has with time come to be construed as
offering protection largely, if not exclusively, to certain protected
classes. Similarly, the resort to effects standards under the Voting
Rights Act is parallel to the shift accomplished through judicial
means in Griggs. Finally, the caveat against proportionate repre-
sentation is akin to the obvious prohibition against quotas that
most people seem to agree belongs in the employment area. 22
This new development is not without its ironies, not the least
of which is that it leads to the very practices that were regarded
as self-evidently wrong in Gomillion. The modern cases under the
Voting Rights Act have as their central objective the maximization
of participation by certain protected groups in the political process.
They welcome the use of race-conscious criteria for setting the
boundary requirements for districts or other requirements for eli-
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members o f a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may
*be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population.
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
21 Id.
2 For an exception, see David Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimi-
nation in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619 (1991). For
my own views, see RIcHARD A. EPsrN, FORBIDDEN GRoUNDs: THE CASE AoANsT THE
EmpxoYmENT DISCRMNATION LAWS 414-15 (1992).
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gibility in elections. The strange twenty-eight-sided figure is back
in style with a vengeance, and it reveals the same urge for politics
to bring about innovations in geometry.2Y The strategies that are
introduced in the new cases are no different in means from those
that were the subject of such self-evident scorn in Gomillion. But
the melody has become sweeter because the tune is played by other
musicians, having other, and more correct, ends. The idea of group
rights that was implicit in Gomillion has become explicit in the
modern materials: the motive of the drafter has become not the
source of condemnation, but the source of justification for what
is done.
As I indicated, I thought that Gomillion was a difficult case
whose result could be defended by looking more closely at the
allocative and distributional consequences that were wrought by
the decision made in Tuskegee. It is also evident that the inquiry
is helped along in a material way because the boundaries were
redrawn by a group that benefitted from them so that there was
no pretense of even-handed neutrality, which might offer partial
cover from the ravages of judicial review. In the end, I think that
this modern concern with group rights under the voting laws is a
mistake. The part of Gomillion that should be preserved is that
which is designed to keep racial motives out of the public decision
making system, not that which is designed to ensure that voting
systems benefit blacks or indeed any other racial or ethnic group.
My title, "Tuskegee Modern," has been chosen to emphasize the
point that developments during the past ten years have been mis-
guided. The ends here do not justify the chosen means. The past
discrimination by members of one group against another should
not become the justification for a repetition of the same error in
the opposite direction. The errors will never cancel out, the ac-
counts will never balance, and the seeds of conflict will be sown
yet again for the next generation. Resting an entire system on the
exclusive concern with protected classes is to take a myopic view
of social conflict and aspirations. The color-blind standard in
As one might expect, colorblindness in the public sphere is on the outs as well.
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Colorblind Constitution," 44 STAN. L. REv.
1 (1991). The article begins with a quotation from Justice John Marshall Harlan's heroic
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896), but then deprecates the notions
that Harlan had defended apparently without any recognition of the social evils that a
faithful adherence to the color-blind standard could have avoided. See id. at 2. Gotanda's
discussion of Plessy, see id. at 38-40, is brief and uninformative, shedding no light on the
passions of the case.
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public affairs, whatever its weakness, does have an appeal to
universality that the alternative notion of the protected class so
desperately lacks.
The argument in support of this claim contains two parts. First,
I shall argue that all voluntary associations should be protected
under the Constitution. 24 Second, I shall argue that it is a mistake
to give groups any special status in constitutional law.2Y The di-
mensions of this error are illustrated vividly by the Voting Rights
Act, where all groups are not alike. We should take no comfort
in the fact that the "right" people now wield the pencil. The key
objective should be to eliminate the twenty-eight-sided figure, not
to ensure that the right people draw it. To speak only of the
districting problem, the proper response is to have no one draw
the boundary lines with political purposes in mind by remitting
that process to an invisible technocrat that has no interest, one
way or the other, in the outcome of the process.
III. How GRouPs Fir -To CONSTiUTIONAL THEORY
A. Voluntary Groups
The initial part of the inquiry asks, how do groups fit into
constitutional theory at all? The point is of obvious concern be-
cause the unit of rights that is found in the critical clauses of the
Constitution is typically the individual.2 6 Thus, the protections
found in both the Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, for example, are all keyed to the person, or to the nature
of the liberty that is protected. There is no mention of group rights
as such being accorded special status under the Constitution. How
then do these arise?
One method is consistent with the basic structure of our system
of constitutional guaranties of rights. Individuals may decide to
come together through voluntary association and thus form groups.
Thus, the right to the free exercise of religion protected by the
First Amendment may well be vested in single individuals, but the
exercise of that right typically involves the intense cooperative
effort that is the hallmark of ordinary religious activities. Similarly,
See infra part III.A.
See infra part III.B.
A point stressed repeatedly by the foes of the 1982 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act. See, e.g., Tiw.STOM, supra note 16, at 132-35.
1991-921
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First Amendment cases like NAACP v. Alabama 27 are best under-
stood not as a special gloss on First Amendment theory, but as an
observation that freedom of association is part of all forms of
individual freedom, as applicable in the area of the First Amend-
ment as anywhere else. It is a fitting irony that persons that are
so suspicious of freedom of contract in general can speak of it in
laudatory terms when the freedom in question is one they like.2 I
also regard the protection of these associations as an inescapable
by-product of the protection of private property, which at least in
cases of land and chattels includes the right to the exclusive use
and disposition of property to whomever the owner sees fit. Groups
have to meet somewhere, and if a private owner cannot exclude
members from his group, then he cannot exclude them from his
property either, as the cases under the National Labor Relations
Act show. 29 The protection flows from all the specific constitutional
guaranties that should be read together to form a consistent vision
of human freedom.
The emphasis upon the role of liberty in dealing with freedom
of association makes it clear that the ends for which groups are
organized, and the criteria they choose for selection, are of no
concern whatsoever to the state. These individuals only wish to
share with each other the rights that they otherwise enjoy singly.
They do not claim through association any right to impose addi-
tional burdens or duties on those persons that, for whatever reason,
are not invited to join their ranks.30 Because any individual can,
given the ordinary rules of civil capacity,31 join whatever groups
are open to him or her, there is no centralized state agency that
determines what groups should be formed or who should form or
join them. These voluntary organizations thus act as a buffer
between the individual and the state, and because their principles
and programs are at cross-purposes, there is another built-in pro-
tection against the dominant power of state officials, surely the
- 357 U.S. 449 (1957) (compelling disclosure of NAACP membership lists might
interfere with freedom of association).
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TPamE, AimucAN CONSTrrmoNAL LAW § 12-26 (2d ed.
1988).
, See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945).
" Groups of this vintage thus satisfy the side-constraints implicit in ROBERT NoZICK,
ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-231 (1974).
11 For a further discussion of the two senses of civil rights, capacity and the norm of
antidiscrimination, see Richard A. Epstein, Two Conceptions of Civil Rights, 8 Soc. PmL.
& POL. 38 (1991).
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greatest fear to which any constitution is directed. The operative
rule therefore should be simple: if anyone wants to form these
groups, the Constitution protects the endeavor. The rights of the
individuals that compose the group, no more and no less, are
transferred to the group itself. The process is therefore simply
additive. If speech, property, and religion are rights that are pro-
tected in the individual group members, then they are protected in
the groups themselves.
This attitude is of course at sharp variance with modern law.
Collective bargaining statutes, for example, create unions that were
not formed by voluntary means. And the costs of that decision are
large. With voluntary groups, all members can be bound by group
decisions in accordance with decision rules that were announced
and accepted at the time the individual joined the union. But that
source of legitimacy is denied when membership in the group is
determined by majority rule. It is therefore no surprise that the
Justices of the Supreme Court are wholly unable to agree about
what activities a group can undertake with the funds of members
that were forced to join the group against their will in the first
place.32 Eliminate the initial use of coercion in the formation of
the group, and the problem disappears. The group can draft pro-
visions that state who will be bound and when, and decide what
mix of voice and exit to allow for the expression of dissenting
views.
There is thus a mortal tension between the enforcement of
antidiscrimination principles for private voluntary associations and
the principle of group autonomy I have just defined. It is quite
clear that the Supreme Court does not believe that the principle of
freedom of association can trump or limit the operation of anti-
discrimination law. Indeed, it has on numerous occasions taken
the undefended position that the elimination of private discrimi-
nation is a "compelling state interest," which justifies limitations
on the freedom of association, however grounded in the Consti-
tution.3 But the proposition is seriously infirm. I regard the
32 See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, I11 S. Ct. 1950, 1959
(1991) (The Court was sharply divided over the ways that a union could spend compelled
contributions from its members. The Court held that the funds could be used for funding
national "nonpolitical" job information services, but not for political lobbying activities-
this is perhaps the best that could be expected under the circumstances.).
11 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-29 (1984). The
decision stressed the importance of "intimate associations," but the operative principle
should extend to all voluntary associations as well.
1991-92]
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unconstitutionality of these antidiscrimination statutes as applied
to any private voluntary organization as too obvious to require
extended argument. 4 In the effort to create ostensible diversity
within groups, the state runs the far greater risk of creating exces-
sive concentration of powers in itself. Now there is far less diversity
between groups and a far smaller range of choices for all persons,
regardless of race, creed, sex, or color.
The situation is more dangerous, for it is quite clear that no
antidiscrimination law will remain neutral in practice, no matter
how it is drafted on its face. The history of Title VII, and the
manifest tension between section 2(a) and section 2(b) of the Voting
Rights Act, offer dramatic proof that the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple is applied in practice in one direction and in one direction
only. Owing to the constellation of political pressures, it is hard
to see how the outcome could be otherwise. For the interest group
that has to choose between fidelity to neutral principles and the
advancement of political causes, the choice is easy: the second wins
out." Such groups do not regard color-blind standards as ends in
themselves, but as short term strategies on the road to greater
political power and control.
It is just that tendency for political power to expand and for
legal principle to erode that should make us wary of modem
appeals to special interest, just as we remain alert to the dangers
of Jim Crow.3 6 The safety and freedom of some groups can never
be secure, unless the safety and freedom of all groups are secure.
Freedom is indivisible for friend and foe alike. We have learned
that lesson the hard way under the First Amendment, where selec-
tive forms of content restriction are deservedly greeted with the
highest levels of judicial scrutiny.37 No system of government can
-1 For a relatively brief statement of my views, see EPsTmN, supra note 22, ch. 6. The
point has been noticed by others whose views are, it is safe to say, radically different from
my own. For example, Mark Kelman, in Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability"
Job Testing, 104 IARv. L. REv. 1158, 1170 n.34 (1991), agrees that the conclusion follows
from my premises, but (in ignorance of FoRBmDEN GROUNDS, supra note 22, at 141-43)
thought that I chose to avoid the point for tactical reasons. I regard the conclusion that
Title VII is flatly unconstitutional as one of the strengths of my theory.
3 The warning of Herbert Wechsler in Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 H.Av. L. REv. 1 (1959), remains relevant. He was surely correct in stressing the
importance of voluntary organization, but incorrect in assuming that segregated schools in
the Old South were segregated along voluntary lines. See id. at 34.
36 On which, see my account in EPSTEN, supra note 22, ch. 5.
3See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
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claim the allegiance of all its citizens if it extends its protections
to only those that are fortunate enough to fall within a protected
class. For all the concerns about caste, and about subordinate
status that might be created by unequal social conditions, there is
almost no awareness of the far greater dangers that a social order
runs of building formal and explicit classifications into the fabric
of the law.
Nor is there anything to fear from a rule that allows organi-
zations to select their own members. It is said that persons will be
excluded from organizations that they wish to join, and of course
that will happen. But here the transaction costs between the organ-
ization and the applicant are low, and if the expanded organization
is for mutual gain, then admission can and will be speedily ar-
ranged: another implication of the Coase theorem.38 Because it is
not, one has to assume that there are losses to the group members
that are smaller than the gains that the would-be applicant is
prepared to pay. The failure of the contract to form should not
be regarded as a lamentable outgrowth of an unfortunate situation.
It should be regarded as information as to the intensity and weight
of preferences. The state should leave well enough alone.
There is an additional reason to protect freedom of association
for private groups. The number of private organizations that will
form can easily be reduced by the insistent pressures that they take
in members whom they wish to exclude. Yet, the greater protection
for individual freedom lies in the richness of the private alternatives
and not in the coercive power of the state. If women and blacks
are excluded from some groups, they will surely be admitted and
welcomed into others: the impulses in favor of affirmative action
are not solely the response to government pressure, but are a
complex admixture of private desire and public coercion. In a
regime of freedom of choice, those that engage in exclusion (or
for that matter in affirmative action) will have to pay a price, and
if they can pay it then they should be allowed to continue as
before, even if their influence is diminished.
History will not be forgotten on matters of race and sex if the
law allows all persons to form whatever voluntary organizations
they see fit. The positions of blacks, of women, of many ethnic
and racial groups are different from the position of the prototypical
white male. But those differences do not justify any difference in
"See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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the legal treatment of special groups. Instead, they powerfully
explain why the patterns of group organization and group mem-
bership will not be symmetrical across race, sex, and class. The
system of freedom of association is able to accommodate those
differences. If some women believe that all-female organizations
are necessary for networking, for bonding, and for advancement,
we should expect a large number of all-female organizations, and
a correspondingly smaller number of all-male ones. The same is
true of race and ethnic lines. I see no more reason for the law to
discourage the formation of these organizations, from which I will
be routinely excluded, than I see for affording them a distinctive
and preferred legal status.
All too often we hear today that women and minorities should
never be excluded from any organization that they wish to join for
reasons of sex or race, but should have the power to exclude others
from the organizations that they wish to form. The risks of this
special pleading are serious. The appetite for preferences can never
be satisfied, so what is advertised as a short term palliative against
some past discrimination becomes embedded as a long term struc-
tural feature in the political culture. The language of subordination,
of victimization, of hierarchy becomes a tool for a new authori-
tarianism that is no better, nor less dangerous, than the older
versions that it replaces. The dangers of unconstrained self-interest
should always be kept at the fore, and these are best controlled by
public systems of formal equality that keep any and all interest
groups from appealing to their own special needs in order to
commandeer the legal and moral power of the state.
Nor can any institution prosper if its membership is determined
by forces from without. The internal dynamics of institutions are
sufficiently fragile that forced interactions change the nature of
the organization in which membership is sought. And for what
gain? There are many ways for persons to make contact with other
people, even if excluded from some groups. Most people join more
than one club or group precisely because they do not wish their
membership in one organization to cut them off from those persons
that cannot join that group. Seen from its systematic viewpoint,
the network of groups that do exist should provide access between
people that want to do business with each other. The ebb and flow
of social pressures should be quite sufficient to limit any abuses
of power that otherwise exist. To repeat, if there are differential
cases to be made for some exclusive groups (blacks or women, for
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example), there is no reason to afford them preferred constitutional
status. If the gains are there, then in a system that protects freedom
of association there will be a larger number of groups that cater
to women and black members. Open systems are fully capable of
registering these historical circumstances.
B. Constitutionally Protected Groups
The present approach toward groups under the Constitution
has quite a different focus. It insists that some system of public
justification can sort out those groups that should be favored from
those that should not. There is a collective determination of which
groups are preferred and which are not: The Black Law Student
Association is acceptable; the Hispanic, Christian, or Jewish Law
Student Association is acceptable; The White Law Student Asso-
ciation or the Men's Law Student Association is not. Yet, the
special imprimatur of the state carries with it an extra benefit that
should be afforded to no group under the theories I developed
above.
The voting rights situation is illustrative of the basic problem.
When Congress provides that districts must be organized to maxi-
mize the influence of any group in the political process,3 9 it nec-
essarily gives chips to some persons and takes them away from
others. If I am able to organize districts in a fashion that maximizes
the number of blacks in Congress, then I have decided to minimize
the number of whites that will hold Congressional office. Exter-
nalities abound in ways that they do not with consensual organi-
zations, which today are under constant legislative attack. The
number of legislative seats is constant, so that a decision to give
more to some, necessarily implies a decision to give fewer to others.
In addition, the constant manipulation of districts changes the
identity of which whites and which blacks will gain office. A district
that is mixed black and white will tend to be represented by a
Congressman whose attitudes and tastes are close to those of the
median voter within the group. Switch the composition of the
group, and the identity of the median voter will shift as well. The
effects will be exerted across all districts, and the net effect will be
to create (in addition to safe black districts) districts represented
by safe conservative Republicans as well. At the Congressional
level, for example, there will be a greater dispersion of sentiments




across the political spectrum, which will make political disagree-
ment more evident and political compromise harder to reach. The
effect of influencing the levels of participation by rigging the
districts is far different from that of increasing levels of partici-
pation by making sure that the polls are open and that the election
officials are fair and respectful of all persons.
There is, moreover, an alternative to the current disarray. We
should learn how dangerous it is to trust any group to decide how
the boundaries should be drawn and why. Here is a case in which
the evil is discretion, no matter who has the power to exercise it.
The response to that problem is to make sure that the pencil that
draws the line is in the hands of one that does not care about the
outcome. The twenty-eight-sided monster can be eliminated by a
simple computer program that starts in one corner of the state.
Standard techniques of district compactness and simplicity of
boundary lines can then avoid the gamesmanship routinely invoked
when electoral commissions draw boundaries, whether or not under
the Voting Rights Act. In some cases, some groups will win, and
in other cases other groups will win. If the process takes place in
a blind fashion across the country and across time, the law of large
numbers should help to "even out" the fortuitous inequalities that
emerge in any individual case. The political wrangling can be
reduced; the special pleadings, the constant drumbeat of discrimi-
nation and victimization can be dulled if not silenced; and the
business of government can go on with less fanfare and hubbub
than before.
The principle of colorblindness, in my view, has no role to play
in the affairs of any private organization, which can be as diverse
or not as it chooses. But colorblindness has a critical role to play
in the public sector, where it serves as a counterweight to coercive
monopoly power that no private firm can exert. The effort to peek
underneath justice's blindfold lends to our process of political
election and representation all the dignity and solemnity found in
a children's game of pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey. Why the current
system of explicit race preferences under the Voting Rights Act is
not violative of the color-blind language of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment is quite beyond me. That amendment is universal in its
phrasing and was designed to call a halt to the destructive processes
of favoritism that called forth its introduction. It was not designed
to allow the victims (or their descendants) to get even with the
wrongdoers (or their descendants). The great principle of all the
Reconstruction Amendments was to get race out of politics. It is
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a pity that the politics of group rights under the Constitution has
again placed race at the political center stage, where the high stakes
up for grabs promise only continued litigation and strife.
In my judgment, our nation has adopted the wrong collective
response to the ever greater diversity of its population. When the
people that compose our nation differ widely in attitudes, back-
grounds, affiliations, and identities, it is idle to assume that they
will be able to iron out their differences by discussion and debate.
Instead it is critical to recognize that, where these differences are
irreconcilable, we should try to remove the stress on our collective
political institutions by taking as much power from the hands of
government as is humanly possible. The problems of determining
proper electoral districts are difficult enough in the best of circum-
stances. The task is hardly made any easier by increasing the stakes
of political action, and through it the stakes in choosing our elected
officials.

